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VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS: USING A MODEL FLAG
STATE COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT TO CONTROL
MARINE POLLUTION
CARMEN CASADO*
[S]hips themselves.., truly embody the anarchy of the open ocean: they
are possibly the most independent objects on earth, many of them without
allegiances of any kind, frequently changing their identityr and assuming
whatever nationality.., allows them to sail as they please.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Prestige oil tanker currently lies on the bottom of the ocean
off the Spanish Costa de la Muerte in the Atlantic, and still contains
about 53,000 metric tons of toxic crude oil.2 Meanwhile the Govern-
ment of Spain has spent $2 billion dollars cleaning up what is consid-
ered one of the world's worst environmental disasters, and has no one
from whom to recover the costs. 3 The incident strikes at the heart of
the weaknesses of the international shipping industry: the lack of a
comprehensive legal framework that oversees and enforces the rule of
law over Flag States, vessels and vessel operators in international wa-
ters.
J.D., California Western School of Law, Magna cum Laude (2004); BA, Lewis and
Clark College (2000); member, State Bar of California. The author would like to express her
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1. William Langewiesche, Anarchy at Sea, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2003, at 1,
http://www.wesjones.com/anarchy.htm.
2. Review of Maritime Transport, 2003, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development, at 41, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/RMT/2003 (2003) [here-
inafter UNCTAD Report].
3. Spain-The Lawless Sea: The Story, PBS, at 2, at http://www.pbs.org/ frontline-
world/stories/spain/thestory.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Lawless Sea: The
Story].
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The Prestige disaster, one of many environmental catastrophes
that has occurred on the high seas, highlights the need for many
changes in the current international legal framework governing ves-
sels. The current international laws of the seas regulating vessels are
dangerously deficient as they are based on the concept of mare
liberum, or freedom of the seas.4 In our current day and age, there is a
compelling need to protect the fragile marine environment, which is
increasingly threatened by marine pollution and over-fishing. There-
fore, a reconfiguration of the law of the sea framework and the im-
plementation of solid and comprehensive legal guidelines with respect
to Flag States and vessels is essential.
Part II of this article gives an overview of the Prestige oil spill
that occurred off the coast of Spain in 2002. It explains the events that
led up to the incident, how the lawless nature of the shipping industry
was a major cause of the accident and the resulting environmental
devastation. Part III explains how current international laws that gov-
ern vessels on the oceans are inadequate, having been unsuccessful in
gaining control of the seas. It then sets forth some of the international
community's responses to the lawless nature of the seas, including:
increased restrictions on vessels traversing waterways; the creation of
national and regional port authorities; the prohibition and phasing out
the use of single hull tankers; amendments to existing international
treaties concerning marine pollution; and voluntary schemes for Flag
States and vessel owners, all aimed at controlling vessels on the high
seas.
Part IV provides an overview of the recently entered into force
Food and Agriculture Organization's Agreement to Promote Compli-
ance with International Conservation and Management Measures by
Fishing Vessels on the High Seas,5 and explains how the Agreement is
a considerably important development that could serve as a model
agreement to govern other types of vessels, particularly, merchant
vessels. Part IV also highlights how the use of structurally deficient
aging tankers among the world merchant fleet, and the lack of an ade-
quate legal regime to control these vessels, create a threat to the global
marine environment. It explains how a model Compliance Agree-
ment, if drafted to apply to vessels that use the high seas for shipping,
would be a sensible solution to these problems. The article concludes
4. See generally Huo GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS vii (Ralph Van Deman
Magoffin trans. & James B. Scott ed., 1916) (1608).
5. Food and Agriculture Organization: Agreement to Promote Compliance with Inter-
national Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, 33
I.L.M. 968 (1994) (entered into force Apr. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Agreement].
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by proposing the idea of the eventual creation of a Global Registry,
and shows how a model Compliance Agreement could serve as an ap-
propriate interim step for such a development.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Prestige Incident
The Aframax Prestige Tanker began her journey in Latvia, des-
tined for Singapore, and stopped in St. Petersburg, Russia where she
loaded up with 77,000 metric tons of crude oil.6 Her journey ended
tragically on November 19, 2002, when she broke in half on the high
seas and sank off the Spanish Costa de la Muerte, or Coast of the
Dead.7 She is now on the seabed of the Atlantic Ocean, 12,000 feet
deep.8 The resulting oil spill is considered one of the worst oil spills
in history.9
The Prestige Tanker was owned by a Greek company, Mare
Shipping, and operated by Swiss-based Crown Resources.' ° She was
registered in Liberia as a way of limiting taxes and liabilities." She
flew the flag of the Bahamas. 2 Her captain, Apostolos Mangouras, is
Greek and her crew, Filipino.' 3
As she approached the Spanish Costa de la Muerte, about 25
miles off the Coast of Galfcia in Northwest Spain, the Prestige en-
countered a windstorm with twenty-foot waves that punctured a hole
in her starboard side tank. 14 Her captain called for help, whereby res-
cue helicopters from Spain evacuated the crew.' 5 The Prestige began
to leak crude oil and drifted within four miles of the Spanish Coast. 6
Due to the severity of the accident, the Spanish Government or-
dered Seraf'm Diaz, a veteran Captain, dispatched to the scene in order
6. UNCTAD Report, supra note 2, at 41.
7. Lawless Sea: The Story, supra note 3, at 1-2.
8. Alexandra Fouchd, Analysis: Salvaging the Prestige, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Dec. 11,
2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2566303.stm.
9. Lawless Sea: The Story, supra note 3, at 1.
10. Paul Reynolds, Analysis: Tightening Rules on Tankers, BBC NEWS ONLINE, at 2,
Nov. 19, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2491699.stm.
11. Lawless Sea: The Story, supra note 3, at 1.
12. Press Release, American Bureau of Shipping, Prestige Casualty-Information Up-
date No. 3, at 1 (Nov. 20, 2002), available at http://www.eagle.org/news/
press/nov202002.html [hereinafter ABS Press Release].
13. Lawless Sea: The Story, supra note 3, at 1.
14. See ABS Press Release, supra note 11, at 4.
15. Lawless Sea: The Story, supra note 3, at 1.
16. Id.
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to steer the Prestige out to sea and away from Spain to avoid envi-
ronmental devastation to the Spanish coasts. 7  When captain
Mangouras adamantly refused, saying the ship needed to be confined
in order to make the repairs necessary to contain the leaking oil, Spain
threatened to bring in the Spanish Navy. 18 The Prestige was then
steered out to sea by Serafin Diaz 9 with the help of the Spanish tug-
boat, Ria de Vigo.2" After several days of sailing and being towed, the
Prestige snapped in two, spewing crude oil, and sank 130 miles off the
Spanish coast.2' Captain Mangouras was arrested and charged with
negligence.22
The accident produced black tides of oil that swept the northern
coast of Spain, and parts of France, killing millions of fish, birds and
other species.23 The tide contaminated 350 miles of coastline with al-
most twice the oil from the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska.24 On some
parts of the Spanish coast the oil was one meter thick. 25  Spain im-
posed a six-month ban on fishing in Galicia, a Spanish region whose
economy is heavily dependent on the fishing sector.26 The cleanup
took approximately 6 months and cost an estimated $2 billion.27 It
will take decades for the Galician marine ecosystem to recover. 21
The local people affected by the incident reacted with intolerance.
The mayor of the coastal town Concurbion in Galicia, which was
badly damaged by the oil, called the incident "an act of terror, a
criminal act" and said "[w]e need an international tribunal to judge...
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1-2.
19. Spain-The Lawless Sea: Interview with Mark Schapiro: Troubled Waters, PBS, at
4, at http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/spain/schapiro.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2005) [hereinafter Schapiro Interview].
20. Nigel Lowry et al., Safety-Alofouzos Leads Owner Fightback on Hull Ban,
LLOYD'S LIST INT., Dec. 6, 2002, at 2.
21. Lawless Sea: The Story, supra note 3, at 2.
22. Id.
23. UNCTAD Report, supra note 2, at 41.
24. Nearly 71,000 tons of oil were spilled by the Prestige, 60 percent more than initially
estimated, compared with 42,769 tons spilled by the Exxon Valdez. Raul Garcia, The Pres-
tige: One Year On, A Continuing Disaster, 26 OIL SPILL INTELLIGENCE REP. 6 (2003). The
Exxon Valdez spill occurred in March of 1989 off of the Coast of Alaska by a single hull
tanker and is considered the biggest oil spill in that area. See Philip Schabecoff, Largest U.S.
Tanker Spill Spews 270,000 Barrels of Oil Off Alaska, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1989, at 1.
25. Begofia P. Ramfrez, Carnota, ni Marisco ni Alemanes, EL MUNDO (Spain), Nov. 23,
2003, available at http://www.elmundo.es/elnundo/2003/11/13/ciencia/1068754586.html.
26. Lawless Sea: The Story, supra note 3, at 2.
27. Id.
28. Schapiro Interview, supra note 19, at 5.
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all those responsible for the spill. '29 On the first anniversary of the
sinking of the Prestige, 100,000 people from the city of Santiago de
Compostela marched in the streets to demonstrate their disdain for the
Prestige disaster.30 A group called Nunca Mais, or "Never Again," in
Gallego, organized the movement.31
"The Spanish government [later] recovered documents from the
Prestige indicating the ship never should have been allowed to go to
sea." 32 The vessel was not seaworthy because it had cracks in sections
of its hull that had been insufficiently welded,3 3 and it had not under-
gone a port inspection in the twelve months prior to the accident, "in
spite of visiting several ports for bunkering.. . . "I Moreover, it was
very difficult to locate the actual owners of the ship because there was
a network of front companies set up.35 The company that owned the
Prestige is based in Liberia and owned by the Coulouthros family, and
the ship is the company's sole asset. 36 Therefore, Spain is unable to
recover.
37
Aside from the cleanup costs spent by the Spanish Government, it
has also paid $208 million in compensation to Regional Govern-
ments. 8  Because Spain has been unable to seek indemnification for
29. Lawless Sea: The Story, supra note 3, at 2.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. "[The Prestige] was one of many [tankers] built quickly and cheaply in Japan
during the... 1970s." Analysis: Vulnerability of Single Hulls, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Nov. 19,
2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2491451.stm [hereinafter Vulnerability of Single
Hulls]. When she sank she was 26 years old, considered well past retirement age for a single-
hulled tanker. See infra text accompanying notes 115-119. Additionally, the previous captain
of the vessel, Esfraitos Kostazos, apparently resigned as captain out of concern that the ship
was in unsound condition, and had faxed letters referencing the bad state of the vessel to both
the owners and to ABS Shipping Company. See Spain-The Lawless Sea: The Paper Trail-
Examining the Case of the Prestige, PBS, at 1, at http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/ sto-
ries/spain/memos.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Lawless Sea: The Paper
Trail].
33. See Vulnerability of Single Hulls, supra note 31. The American Bureau of Shipping
ordered major repairs for these cracks in 2001, which were welded in China shortly thereafter.
Id. Although it is not certain this was the cause of the accident, experts speculate it was. Id.
34. UNCTAD Report, supra note 2, at 41.
35. Lawless Sea: The Story, supra note 3, at 2; see also supra text accompanying notes
9-12.
36. Lawless Sea: The Story, supra note 3, at 2.
37. Id. Spain cannot go after Swiss Crown Resources, the ship's operator, due to an
agreement between Swiss Crown Resources and its owners, putting liability on the owner of
the ship. See Criticas, Responsabilidades y Culpas en el Desastre del 'Prestige,' EL MUNDO
(Spain), Nov. 21, 2002, available at http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2002/1l/
19/ciencia/1037742422.html.
38. La Comisidn del Prestige Cree que 160 Millones de Euros para Indemnizaciones
son 'Suficientes,' EL MUNDO (Spain), Aug. 3, 2003, available at http://www.elmundo.es/ el-
mundo/2003/08/02/ciencia/1059833591.html. Fifteen percent of the costs suffered by locals
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the costs of the cleanup and other compensations, it is filing a $750
million lawsuit against the ship's classification society, American Bu-
reau of Shipping (ABS), in New York Federal Court.39 ABS surveyed
the Prestige just six months before it sank.4° Spain is claiming the
company acted negligently in not carrying out its responsibilities of
inspection of the vessel.4' The company is counterclaiming, alleging
the Spanish Government is responsible for the accident for refusing to
let the distressed vessel take refuge in its ports so it could make the
42necessary repairs.
Maritime union officials say Captain Mangouras, who is currently
on "trial in Spain, is a "scapegoat" for an "out-of-control international
system. . ." that allows broken-down," sea unworthy vessels to roam
the seas.43 Who is really responsible for this and the numerous other
high profile disasters occuring on the high seas? How can these casu-
alties be avoided in the future? The following sections address and at-
tempt to answer these questions.
III. LAW
A. International Law's Flimsy Oversight of the Shipping Industry
1. Shadows on the High Seas
The oceans are a "world of shadows wild and chaotic and increas-
ingly beyond government control."'  This is because the predominate
legal paradigm governing the laws of the seas is mare liberum, or
will be paid by the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund for damages caused by
pollution by hydrocarbons. Id The EU has also given Spain 344.5 million euros for the total
clean up and indemnifications. De Palacio: "Espaiia ha Obtenido de la UE 110 Millones y
Francia, tras Hundirse el 'Erika', S61o 10," EL MUNDO (Spain), Jan. 13, 2003, available at
http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2003/01/12/ciencia/1042407352.html.
39. Lawless Sea: The Story, supra note 3, at 2; see also Lawless Sea: The Paper Trail,
supra note 32, at 1.
40. Lawless Sea: The Story, supra note 3, at 2.
41. See Spain-The Lawless Sea: The Paper Trail-Examining the Case of the Prestige:
The Company View: Response from ABS to Frontline/World, at 3-4, available at
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/spain/response.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2005)
[hereinafter Lawless Sea: Company View].
42. Id. ABS is claiming, among other things, that Spain is liable under both applicable
Spanish law and International Conventions that impose duties on States to minimize pollu-
tion. See id. at 4.
43. Lawless Sea: The Story, supra note 3, at 3.
44. William Langewiesche Discusses the Difficulties in Policing Ships Sailing the
Oceans (NPR radio broadcast Aug. 11, 2003) available at http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyld= 1392315 [hereinafter NPR broadcast].
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freedom of the high seas.45 The concept of mare liberum, established
by Hugo Grotius in the 17 th century, is based on the notion the seas are
a space common to all mankind, and therefore cannot be exclusively
owned by anyone, but are to be used by everyone. 4 The persistence
of this doctrine has resulted in irresolute laws, whereby shipping re-
mains one of the world's least regulated activities.47
The Prestige oil spill is one of numerous casualties that occur on
the high seas as a result of this weak international legal status, which
fails to control and monitor the activities of vessels.48 Much needs to
be done to gain control of the world's oceans. In order to ensure safe,
secure and environmentally sound shipping operations, it is vital there
be a solid legal framework to oversee vessels, especially the shipping
industry.
45. These freedoms, however, are not absolute. See United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force Nov. 16,
1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS]. This recent Convention has established zones such as the Ex-
clusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf and navigational rights, pollution control, ma-
rine scientific research, and fisheries regulation, establishing State authority over certain areas
of the seas. See generally id
46. See GROTIus, supra note 4, at 24. Hugo Grotius was a lawyer for the Dutch who
wrote the essay Freedom of the Seas in order to defend interests of the Dutch on the high seas
against the claims of Spain, Portugal, and Britain. He advocated that all nations should have
free and equal access to the seas and argued "the sea is common to all, because it is so limit-
less that it cannot become a possession of any one." Id. at 28.
47. Spain-The Lawless Sea: Hiding Behind the Flag: Introduction, PBS, at 1, at
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/spain/flags1.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2005) [here-
inafter Lawless Sea: Hiding Behind the Flag: Introduction].
48. Beyond the scope of this article, but of increasing concern to the global community,
is the growing threat of marine terrorism. Terrorists are making use of the shipping industry
to carry out their terrorist activities. Vice Admiral Timothy Keating Briefing via Satellite-
Teleconference from Bahrain (Dept. of Defense briefing, Apr. 12, 2003), at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/2003/tr20030412-0092.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2005).
On October 12, 2000 al-Qaeda terrorists attacked the U.S. Navy destroyer U.S.S. Cole in the
Yemeni port of Aden, killing seventeen crewmembers and injuring many others. E.g., Wil-
liam Branigin, Two Sentenced to Die for USS Cole Attack, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2004, at
A18. Also there have been recent discoveries that al-Qaeda is using marine transport to traf-
fic drugs in order to raise money for terrorist activities. E.g., Rowan Scarborough, Drug
Money Sustains al-Qaeda; Cut-off Needed to Strangle Cells, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2003, at
Al. In mid December of 2003 the US Navy seized three ships in the Arabian Gulf that were
linked to al-Qaeda. Id.; Afghanistan Drugs and Terrorism and U.S. Security Policy, Hearing
Before the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., 26, 29 (2004), available at
http://wwwc.house.gov/internationalrelations/108/91798.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2005).
The United States is particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks carried out in its Marine
Transport System. See Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S.
Seaports, Fall 2000, available at http://www.securitymanagement.com/library/sea-
portl200.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2005).
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2. International Law Endows Flag States with
Ultimate Responsibility of Vessels
The existing laws and regulations that govern vessels on the high
seas vary from state to state and by agreement, and there exists an
overall lack of compliance-inducing mechanisms.4 9 The current
framework governing vessels provides Flag States ultimate authority
over vessels. ° Vessels only answer to the Flag States, who need not,
and often do not, comply with international laws and norms respecting
safety on the high seas. As a result, the shipping industry fleet, trans-
porting 80% of the world's goods, including toxic cargo, is able to use
Flag States to escape complying with internationally accepted norms
and standards for vessels.51
International Law has attempted to address the absolute chaos to
which the absence of any authority over vessels sailing in international
waters would lead. Currently, every ship on the high seas must fly a
flag of a nation. 2 Under the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is the predominant convention codifying
the laws of the seas, if a vessel is not flying the flag of a nation while
on the high seas, any State can board the ship.53 Therefore, "a state-
less vessel[] ... may not claim the protection of international law and
does not have the right to travel the high seas with impunity. '54
According to UNCLOS, for a vessel to sail under the flag of a
Flag State there must be a "genuine link" between the vessel and the
issuing State. The genuine link requirement is met if the vessel's na-
tionality is the same as the State under whose flag it flies.56 The term
"nationality" in this context is not the same as nationality of citizens;
49. William Langewiesche, a critic of the current legal framework of the laws of the
seas, refers to it as a "fantasy floating free of the realities at sea." Langewiesche, supra note 1,
at 9. He uses the example of the International Maritime Organization, which he calls a "typi-
cally idealistic construct" because the IMO itself does not have any enforcement powers, and
the 162 member states do not have the expertise or inclination to enforce their own powers.
See id.
50. "The common legal understanding of 'flag state' is the administration or the gov-
ernment of the 'state' whose flag the ship is entitled to fly." ROUND TABLE OF SHIPPING
INDUSTRY ORGANIZATIONS, SHIPPING INDUSTRY GUIDELINES ON FLAG STATE PERFORMANCE 3
(2003) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
51. See Lawless Sea: Hiding Behind the Flag, Introduction, supra note 47, at 1.
52. UNCLOS, supra note 45, art. 110 (1)(d).
53. Id. art. 110(l)(d). For example "in enforcing the U.S. maritime drug laws, the
United States not only boarded, but seized, stateless vessels. Louis B. SOHN & JOHN E.
NOYES, CASES AND MATERIAL ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 105 (2004) (internal citation omitted).
54. United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 260 (2d Cir. 1983).
55. UNCLOS, supra note 44, art. 91(1).
56. Id. art. 91.
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rather, it is used to define the legal relationship between the Flag State
and the ships authorized to fly under its flag.57 Under the current in-
ternational legal framework governing the laws of the seas, the regis-
tration of vessels with the Flag State is the primary way in which a
State shows the vessels to which it has granted nationality.
58
Aside from this tenuous link requirement, the Convention imposes
no limits on the State's authority to determine on its own the condi-
tions under which to grant nationality to vessels. 59 Article 91 of
UNCLOS provides, "[e]very State shall fix the conditions for the
grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its terri-
tory, and for the right to fly its flag." 6 Because Flag States determine
for themselves the conditions under which to grant nationality to ves-
sels, they accept responsibility for the ship and acquire authority over
it. 61
Thus, issuing Flag States have ultimate authority and responsibil-
ity over vessels flying under their flag. They also have complete ju-
risdiction over these ships on the high seas and are "obligated to en-
force rules regarding navigation, safety, and administrative, technical
and social matters. 62 This principle of Flag State control and ultimate
authority determines the freedoms of vessels, which would be under-
cut if any State could legally interfere with them while on the high
seas.
63
Due to the virtually absolute nature of its authority, it is the Flag
State that plays the critical role with respect to safety of life at sea, se-
curity, protection of the marine environment and even good employ-
ment conditions for seafarers.64 Yet oftentimes the Flag State that
grants its nationality to ships does not enforce these rules.65 In fact,
there are a handful of countries that capitalize on the existing legal
framework allowing them to grant nationality to any vessel, and which
57. "[T]he ship, everything on it, and every person involved or interested in its opera-
tions are treated as an entity linked to the [Filag [S]tate. The nationalities of the persons are
not relevant." ITLOS: MV "Saiga" (No. 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), 38
I.L.M. 1323, 1347 (1999).
58. SoHN&NoYEs, supra note 53, at 103.
59. Id. at 111-6 (citing C. JoHN COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 290
(6th rev. ed. 1967)).
60. UNCLOS, supra note 44, art. 91.
61. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584 (1953).
62. SoHN & NoYEs, supra note 53, at 104; see also UNCLOS, supra note 44, art. 94.
63. SOHN & NoYEs, supra note 53, at 104.
64. GUIDELINES, supra note 50, at 4.
65. See infra pp. 221-25.
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lacks a mechanism for ensuring they carry out their Flag State obliga-
tions.
3. Flags of Convenience
Substantial regulation of the international shipping industry is
prevented in part by the ability of shipowners to get "flagged" in for-
eign countries that may have far less stringent safety and labor re-
quirements than those of their home country. 66 These ship registries,
known as "open registry," or by critics as "flags of convenience," of-
fer registry of vessels under their flags while maintaining minimum
requirements such as low taxes, low fees, no requirement of national
ownership or control of the vessels, and no requirements regarding na-
tional crews, officers or build.67 It is not even necessary the country
have a coastline to grant its flag.68
This system, although created during World War 11,69 expanded
enormously in the 1990s as a direct result of the international commu-
nity's attempts to regulate vessels on the high seas.70 By the end of
2002, 47.2 percent of the world fleet was registered in major open-
registries.7" The system of open registries reflects "free enterprise at
its freest,"72 where vessel owners and operators see it as a means of
"law shopping" and Flag States compete for the vessels' business, by
lowering their standards.73
"[A] mockery of national conceits, ' 74 the current registry system
has resulted in the majority of shipowners, who are from major mari-
time powers such as the United States, China, Greece, Norway, Brit-
ain and Japan, registering their vessels in countries like Panama, Libe-
ria, the Bahamas, Malta, Cyprus and Bermuda.75 Some of the States
66. See Lawless Sea: Hiding Behind the Flag, Introduction, supra note 47, at 1-2
67. SoHN & NoYES, supra note 53, at 107. Currently, the six major open registries are:
Panama, Liberia, Bahamas, Malta, Cyprus and Bermuda. See UNCTAD Report, supra note 2,
at 35.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
69. The system of vessel flagging began in the United States in World War I. See NPR
broadcast, supra note 44, at 2. The U.S. Government advocated this virtually lawless system
before entering World War II in an effort to get around its own neutrality laws. Id Following
the war, the lack of regulations of the oceans increased, catalyzed by free market interests. Id
70. See Langewiesche, supra note 1, at 1.
71. UNCTAD Report, supra note 2, at 28. Just over forty-eight percent of these ships
are oil tankers. Id. at 29. Developing countries have another 25.7% of the world fleet regis-
tered in their countries. Id at 28.
72. Langewiesche, supra note 1, at 1.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. UNCTAD Report, supra note 2, at 35. For example, in 2002, 70.2% of vessels from
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offering flags of convenience are unscrupulous in complying with
their obligations to implement and enforce international maritime
regulations for ships granted the right to fly their flag.76
Furthermore, "[o]ffshore front companies... obscure the identity
of ship owners making it difficult and time-consuming to hold [them]
legally or financially accountable for damage caused by their ships.""
As noted by the Secretariat of the United Nations Convention on
Trade and Development, "open registries enable shipowners from de-
veloped countries to relocate their activities without losing any control
over them and create an artificial competitiveness by avoiding rules
and regulations established in the countries of beneficial ownership, as
well as permitting uncontrolled employment of low-cost, ship-board
labour from developing countries."78 Therefore sub-standard opera-
tors can get away with sub-standard practices, which are ultimately
detrimental to the shipping industry and the international community
as a whole.
According to the Flag State Performance Table, compiled by the
Round Table of Shipping Industry Organizations,79 the following Flag
States have significant negative performance indicators: Albania, Be-
lize, Bolivia, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Honduras, Jordan, Madagascar, Sao Tome & Principe, Suriname and
the Syrian Arab Republic.80 These indicators are derived from various
factors and include inter alia: whether the Flag State is on an associa-
tion's port state control black list (a list of ships that are considered a
threat to ports and therefore have restricted access); low or no atten-
dance at International Maritime Organization meetings; non-
ratification of international conventions; failure to achieve a place on
developed market-economies were registered in foreign registries. Id. at 32.
76. Of course, not all open registries are unscrupulous in their international obligations.
GUIDELINES, supra note 50, at 5. Furthermore, it is the small minority of ship owners and op-
erators who are non-compliant. Id. Many ships that are compliant have legitimate reasons to
fly the flag of less scrupulous Flag States. Id. For example, the Flag State might be "the
country in which the company is located, there may be implications for the employment of
certain nationalities of seafarers, or else the use of particular flags could be determined by the
terms of a ship's charter." Id.
77. See Lawless Sea: Hiding Behind the Flag, Introduction, supra note 47, at 2.
78. SoHN &NoYEs, supra note 53, at 117 (quoting U.N. Doc. TD/B/1013, at23 (1984)).
79. The Round Table consists of the International Chamber of Shipping, International
Shipping Federation, BIMCO, Intercargo and Intertanko. GUIDELINES, supra note 50, at 1.
80. Id., Flag State Performance Table. This table is periodically updated by the Round
Table and is available at http://www.marisec.org/flag-performance/ (last visited Mar. 11,
2005). Id.
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the International Maritime Organization's white list;8 and the average
age of the vessels that fly the flag of the ship.8 2
The Bahamas, under whose flag the Prestige flew, is considered
to be a flag of convenience. It is the world's largest cruise registry
and is criticized for attracting cruise lines from around the world that
seek to avoid the more stringent labor requirements that would apply
if they were registered in their home country.83 Among the major
cruise lines registered under the Bahamian flag are Carnival, Disney
and Norwegian Cruise Lines. 4
The Prestige was flying the Bahamian Flag when she sank, de-
spite the fact that the Bahamas is a party to numerous international
conventions aimed at preventing catastrophes on the high seas. 5
Among the more important conventions to which the Bahamas is a
party are the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS)86 and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pol-
81. The IMO's White List is a list intended to reveal Parties who give full effect to the
1995 amendments to the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watch Keeping for Seafarers, July 7, 1978, S. Exec. Doc..EE, 96-1 (1980), 1361 U.N.T.S.
190 [hereinafter STCW]. The amendments completely revised the convention to make it
more uniform, efficient and enforceable. To be placed on the White list Parties to STCW
have to submit to the IMO Secretary-General information to show that they are giving full
and complete effect to the Convention, which is then handed over for evaluation to panels.
Countries not on the white list are increasingly targeted by Port State Control inspectors and
Flag States that are Parties to the White List can elect to not accept seafarers who carry cer-
tificates issued by non White List countries for service on its ships. See International Conven-
tion on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers, 1978,
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?doc-id=651&topic-id=257 (last visited Mar.
11,2005).
82. GUIDELINES, supra note 50, Flag State Performance Table.
83. See Spain-The Lawless Sea: Hiding Behind the Flag: Bahamas: Cruising a Sea of
Labor Complaints, PBS, at 1, at http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/spain/baha-
mas.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Lawless Sea: Hiding Behind the Flag: Ba-
hamas].
84. According to the International Transport Workers' Federation, more than a third of
workers on cruise ships flying the Bahamian flag work 10- to 12-hour days seven days a
week. Id.
85. See IMO Statement, The Prestige, at www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.
asp?topicid=583&docid=2583 (last visited Mar. 11, 2005). The Bahamas is also a mem-
ber to the following conventions: IMO convention (1948), IMO Amendments (1991, 1993),
SOLAS Protocols (1978, 1998), Load Lines Convention (1966), Load Lines Protocol (1988),
Tonnage Convention (1969), COLREG Convention (1972), CSC Convention (1978), STCW
Convention (1978), INMARSAT Convention (1976), Inmarst OA (1976), INMARST
Amendments (1998), FACILITATION Convention (1965), MARPOL Annexes /IU, III, V(1973, 1978), MARPOL Protocol Annex VI (1997), INTERVENION Convention (1969),
INTERVENTION Protocol (1973), CLC Protocol (1976), CLC Protocol (1992), FUND Pro-
tocol (1976), PAL Convention (1974), PAL Protocol (1976), LLMC Convention (1976), and
the OPRC Convention (1990). See IMO, Status of Conventions-Complete List,
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data id%3D871 l/status.xls (last visited Feb.
22, 2005).
86. Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 14 I.L.M. 959 [hereinafter SOLAS). SOLAS is the most
12
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lution from Ships (MARPOL).87 Since the Prestige incident the Ba-
hamas has taken steps to better ensure its maritime security regime.88
Yet under the current international legal framework, the only State
that can challenge the validity of the registration of vessels with all
Flag States, is the registering State.89 Therefore there is no effective
audit or enforcement mechanism other than the Flag States them-
selves, of which many have proved to be unworthy. This major defi-
ciency in the law of the sea framework, and its resulting effects, e.g.
the sinking of the Prestige, are being brought to the attention of the in-
ternational community and are being challenged. Currently guidelines
and laws aimed at strengthening the legal system governing the ship-
ping industry are being developed and implemented in an attempt to
address the existing problems.
B. International Measures Being Implemented
The need for better Flag State and vessel owner and operator ac-
countability is evident. The Food and Agriculture Organization's
Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation
and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (also
known as the FAO Compliance Agreement) is an attempt to address
the current problems of unscrupulous vessels, operators and Flag
States, who are an increasing threat to the marine environment.90 Al-
important international Convention that deals with the Safety of Life at Sea. International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME
ORGANIZATION, at http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?topic-id=257&doc_id=647
(last visited Mar. 11, 2005).
87. Nov. 2, 1973, 1313 U.N.T.S. 3, 12 I.L.M. 1319 (entered into force Oct. 2, 1983),
modified, Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pol-
lution from Ships, Feb. 17, 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184, 17 I.L.M. 546 (entered into force Oct.
2, 1983) [hereinafter MARPOL]. The MARPOL Convention is the main international con-
vention governing the prevention of pollution of the marine environment by vessels caused by
operation or accidents. It consists of two treaties adopted in 1973 and 1978 and has been up-
dated by amendments through the years. International Convention for the Pollution from
Ships, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, at http://www.imo.org/conventions/ con-
tents.asp?doc.id=678&topic-id=258 (last visited Mar. 11, 2005).
88. Mike Corkhill, Special Report - Ship Registers: Bahamas Consolidates Place on
Maritime Safety Podium, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Sept. 5, 2003, at 14. The Bahamas has been
criticized because under these conventions it is the Flag State's duty to carry out a post-
accident investigation and issue a report to the IMO as to the causes of the incident (see
MARPOL, supra note 87, art. 12, 12 I.L.M. at 1327), which the Bahamas has not yet done.
See Brian Reyes, MEP Sterckx Calls for States to Resist Criminalising Seafareres: Industry
Welcomes Draft Report from European Parliament, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Mar. 3, 2004, at 1.
89. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584 (1953) (demonstrating that the United
States has firmly and successfully insisted on this policy).
90. Agreement supra note 5. The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) is an inter-
governmental, non-profit organization, a specialized agency of the United Nations, whose
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though it only applies to fishing vessels, its framework can just as well
be applied to other types of vessels that use the high seas.
Many other commendable efforts by the international shipping in-
dustry, coastal states, and related organizations have been attempted
or are underway, as explained below. The FAO Compliance Agree-
ment, in particular, is a thorough and comprehensive response, and
would serve as an excellent model for the enforcement and oversight
of all vessels and Flag States.
1. Coastal State Measures
The sinking of the Prestige was an incident too large to be ig-
nored. European nations, especially Spain and France with strong
fishing sectors, are demanding fundamental changes be undertaken
that will ensure an environmental disaster of such a magnitude never
again devastates Europe's coasts and waters. Following the catastro-
phe, Jacques Chirac, the Prime Minister of France, demanded draco-
nian measures be implemented.91 Loyola de Palacio, Vice-President
of the European Commission in charge of transport and energy, ex-
pressed the importance of re-examining "the international rules con-
cerning the law of the sea" in order to "address questions related to the
protection of [coastal] States to regulate maritime safety and pollution
prevention adequately."'  This backlash has manifested itself in a
number of ways, including prompting the implementation of coastal
state measures to regulate vessels.
The European Union has since taken measures to prevent laden
vessels, and especially tankers, from traversing EU waters.93 The
mission is to facilitate and secure the long-term sustainable development and utilization of the
world's fisheries and aquaculture; About Us, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, at http://www.fao.org/UNFAO/about/indexen.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2005). For more information on the FAO, see http://www.fao.org.
91. See An Accident at Sea Creates Much Froth, THE ECONOMIST (London), Nov. 23,
2002, available at 2002 WL 7248261.
92. See Press Release, European Commission, Commission Proposes to Strengthen Se-
curity in European Ports IP.03/135 (Feb. 17, 2004), available at http://europa.eu.int.
93. This is not the first time that countries badly affected by oil spills have sought to im-
plement legislation that would protect their coasts from further devastation. After the Exxon
Valdez spill off of the coast of Alaska, the United States planned a phase-out of single hull
tankers. The Erika spill led to the creation of the European Maritime Safety Agency and two
sets of European reforms. And, since Erika, most big oil companies are shifting away from
single-hulled tankers. The first reforms increased controls in ports, tightened up procedures
for ship inspections, and accelerated the timetable for eliminating shingle-hulled tankers. The
second tackled longer-term issues like the creation of a compensation fund for victims of oil
spills and the creation of a European Maritime-Safety Agency. After the Prestige incident the
shipping industry is again raising its standards. See Once More a Breach, THE ECONOMIST
(London), Nov. 23, 2002, 2002 WL 724867.
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leaders, Spain, France and Portugal, initiated this movement by collec-
tively banning single hull tankers from their 200-mile exclusive eco-
nomic zones prior to legislation being in place.94 The ban was en-
forced in December 2002, when a Greek tanker carrying 81,000 tons
of fuel oil heading for Spain through the Strait of Gibraltar was or-
dered to keep 200 miles away from the coasts of France and Spain. 95
Also, three Maltese-flagged vessels have been escorted out of the
French, Spanish and Portuguese exclusive economic zones.96 How-
ever, according to the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), the
actions taken by these countries are clearly in violation of Articles 56,
211 and 220 of UNCLOS.97 The Convention offers the right of free-
dom of navigation to ships traveling through Coastal States' exclusive
economic zones. 9
8
In addition, the EU itself is taking steps to rid its waters of sub-
standard vessels. It has published a list of more than 66 ships that it
considers to be suspect and that would have been banned if new Euro-
pean maritime safety rules had been in force at the time.99 It has also
adopted a proposal that will lead to the imposition of criminal sanc-
tions for those who cause pollution from vessels. 10° And, it recently
94. See UNCTAD Report, supra note 2, at 41. The Exclusive Economic Zone is the
200-mile contiguous zone of water around a State's coast. Its concept was codified in interna-
tional law at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. See UNCLOS, su-
pra note 45, arts. 55, 57.
95. Lowry, supra note 20, at 1.
96. Id.
97. Id. Article 56 covers rights and duties and jurisdictions of coastal States of the cor-
responding exclusive economic zone, providing "the coastal State [ have due regard to the
rights and duties of other States .... UNCLOS, supra note 45. Article 211 sets forth that no
state can adopt regulations, which relate to design, construction, manning or equipment stan-
dards other than generally accepted international standards, even if they are acting through the
relevant International Body, the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Id. Article 220
describes the steps coastal states may take if they find a vessel in their exclusive economic
zone is violating a law. In accordance with this article coastal states are authorized to require
the vessel to give information regarding its identity and port of registry and under some cir-
cumstances can undertake physical inspection of the vessel and institute proceedings includ-
ing detaining the vessel. Id.
98. UNCLOS, supra note 44, arts. 58 (1)-(2).
99. See Press Release, European Commission, The European Commission Takes Steps
to Ban Substandard Oil Tankers from European Waters IP/02/1791 (Dec. 3, 2002), available
at http://europa.eu.int. This list of ships is based on Article 7(b) of Directive 95/21/EC on
Port State Control. The ships come from the following countries: Turkey, St. Vincent &
Grenadines, Cambodia, Algeria, Panama, Sao Tome and Principe, Bolivia, Egypt, Romania,
Honduras, Lebanon, Morocco, and the Syrian Arab Republic. Eight of these ships are oil
tankers. Id.
100. See Press Release, European Commission, The Commission proposes Criminal
Sanctions for Polluting Ships IP/03/316 (Mar. 5, 2003). This plan is consistent with
UNCLOS Article 218 (1), which allows States to investigate and prosecute discharge offences
in the high seas. See UNCLOS, supra note 44.
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enacted a regulation banning single-hull oil tankers from European
ports.
10
'
2. Port State Measures
Another response to the increasing problems on the high seas has
been a global trend in the development of Port State Authorities,
which seek to improve, among other things, the elimination of sub-
standard ships by the enforcement of internationally accepted mini-
mum standards on the construction, design, equipment and manning
of vessels. "02 Many countries are not satisfied that the existing current
international regulations are being enforced and regional groupings
are being formed to carry out checks themselves. 13 In Europe and
North America, for example, 20 maritime administrations have joined
the Paris Memorandum, which initiates about 18,000 checks a year. 104
There are currently three principal regional Port State Control au-
thorities that target particular flags on vessels on the basis of deficien-
cies and detentions recorded for ships flying that particular flag.0"
They are the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (1982), the Tokyo
Memorandum (1993) of Understanding, and the United States. °6
Europe has, in addition to the Paris MOU, adopted a Directive on Port
State Control that is currently being reviewed to improve measures
against substandard shipping. 107
101. See generally Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, July 22,
2003, (EC) No. 1726/2003, O.J. (L 249/1) [hereinafter EC Regulation].
102. Doris K6nig, Port State Control: An Assessment of European Practice, in MARINE
ISSUES FROM A SCIENTIFIC, POLITICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 37, 37 (Peter Ehelers et al.
eds., 2002).
103. Paul Reynolds, Analysis: Tightening Rules on Tankers, BBC NEWS ONLINE, at 2,
Nov. 19, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2491699.stm.
104. See Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, at
http://www.parismou.org/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2005). This Agreement applies to the waters
of the Coastal States of Europe, as well as the North Atlantic Basin from North America. See
id. The MOU sets forth criteria that ships must meet in order to pass into Paris MOU Ports
without being detained. If a ship is detained multiple times it is considered a banned ship and
will be refused access to ports that belong to any region of the Memorandum. See Paris
Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in Implementing Agreements on Mari-
time Safety and the Protection of the Marine Environment, Jan. 26, 1982, sec. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1,
4-6.
105. GUIDELINES, supra note 50, at 10. There are a total of eight regional port State con-
trol regimes worldwide; the other five authorities are: Vifia del Mar MOU (1992); Caribbean
MOU (1996); Mediterranean MOU (1997); Indian Ocean MOU (1998); Abuja (West and
Central African) MOU (1999); and the Black Sea MOU (2000). These regimes are consistent
with the LOS Convention. KONIG, supra note 102, at 39.
106. See GUIDELINES, supra note 50, at 10.
107. KONIG supra note 102, at 37.
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Under international law, as codified in UNCLOS, port states can
prescribe national rules and standards to apply to foreign vessels that
wish to enter the internal waters, offshore terminals and ports of the
State.108 Port states are also granted the authority to enforce relevant
international rules and standards that relate to the seaworthiness of the
ships, if they wish. 109 They are limited however, to permitting vessels
in violation of the law to sail to the "nearest appropriate repair yard
and, upon removal of the causes of the violation, [the port state] shall
permit the vessel to continue immediately."' 0 But because the vari-
ous international conventions, and the individual state and regional au-
thorities apply different rules and standards, port state control is not as
effective as it could be both as a deterrent and control mechanism.
The "varying regulations and levels of implementation [among the
conventions and state and regional authorities] creates the opportunity
for ships to "slip through the net." 1 ' Furthermore some port states
show little interest in improving inspection and control. 112 And, as
there is often a shortage of qualified inspectors, some authorities se-
lect well-maintained ships to inspect so as to minimize time spent on
the inspections.113 The fact the Prestige had visited several ports
without being inspected prior to her accident emphasizes the low rate
of inspection practiced by some port states.'14
3. Vessel Construction Measures
The European Union has led the way to reforms for the phase out
of single hull tankers, which have since been adopted by the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization. It recently enacted a Regulation that ac-
celerates the pre-existing phasing-out requirements on single-hull oil
tankers and phasing-in of double-hull tankers. 15 The Regulation
states the European Community "is seriously concerned that the age
limits for the operation of single-hull oil tankers . . . are not suffi-
108. UNCLOS, supra note 44, art. 211(3).
109. Id. art. 219; see also id. art. 218.
110. Id. art. 219.
111. Vulnerability of Single Hulls, supra note 32, at 2.
112. See, e.g., Case C-315/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Re-
public, 1999 E.C.R. 1-8001 (addressing infringement procedures against Italy for not trans-
posing the PSC-Directive into national legislation).
113. KONIG, supra note 102, at 47.
114. See UNCTAD Report, supra note 2, at 41.
115. See EC Regulation, supra note 101, para. 1. This Regulation amends a previous
Regulation that establishes an accelerated phase-in scheme with design requirements for sin-
gle hull tankers. Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, Nov. 29, 2002,
EC 417/2002, O.J. (L 64) 1.
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ciently stringent. Particularly in the wake of the shipwreck of the...
'Prestige' of the same age as 'Erika' (26 years) those age limits should
be further lowered."'1 16 Hence single-hull oil tankers may no longer be
used to carry heavy grades of oil to or from EU Ports,"7 all oil tankers
more than 23 years old were banned immediately, 1 8 and tankers 15
years old or older must undergo exhaustive technical inspections re-
ferred to as a condition assessment scheme.119
The IMO, prompted by Europe, is supporting the movement for
the phase-out of single-hull oil tankers. 120 It proposed a stricter timeta-
ble for the phasing-out of single-hull tankers, which was then imple-
mented by amending 13G of Annex I of the MARPOL Convention in
December of 2003.121 The previous IMO Plan under the MARPOL
Convention also sought to eventually phase out these tankers but was
"too slow and staggered. ' 122  The new phase-out timetable is much
more simplified and accelerated. Under this new scheme, single-hull
tankers will still be allowed to use the high seas to trade until 2005.123
And, "the last phase-out date for all single-hulled oil tankers is 2010
instead of 2015, with the oldest, built in 1977 and earlier, to be taken
out of service in April 2005. ' '124
However, the IMO has made some compromises to the timetable.
For example Flag States can, in some circumstances, allow the opera-
tion of single-hull tankers until 2015 or the 2 5 th anniversary of build if
they pass a strict scrutinization to assure they are seaworthy and pre-
sent no safety or environmental hazards. 12 5
116. EC Regulation, supra note 101, para. 3.
117. Id. art. 1(4)(d).
118. Id. art. 1(4)(a).
119. Id. arts. 1(5) & 1(6).
120. See Marine Environment Protection Committee, IMO Meeting Adopts Accelerated
Single-hull Tanker Phase-out, New Regulation on Carriage of Heavy Fuel Oil, 50th session,
Dec. 1 & 4, 2003, available at http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic-id
=758&docid=3341 (last visited Mar. 11, 2005).
121. See MARPOL, supra note 87, at 12.
122. See Stefano Ambrogi, Reuters, Update 2-UN Brings Forward Global Single Hull
Tanker Ban, Dec. 5, 2003, at http://www.forbes.com/newswire/2003/12/05/rtrl 171146.htil.
123. See MARPOL, supra note 87, at 12. The amendments entered into force on April 5,
2005. Even prior to entry into force, the IMO urged Parties to MARPOL to "seriously...
consider the application of the amendments as soon as possible to ships entitled to fly their
flag, without waiting for the amendments to enter into force and to communicate this action to
the Organization[]" and to "implement the aforesaid amendments to Annex I of MARPOL
73/78 effectively as soon as possible." Id. at 13.
124. Ambrogi, supra note 122, at 2.
125. Id.
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4. Flag State Measures
The Round Table of shipping industry organizations, comprised
of the International Chamber of Shipping, International Shipping Fed-
eration, Baltic and International Marine Council (BIMCO), Intercargo
and Intertanko, have recently drafted Guidelines for ship operators to
encourage them to examine whether a flag has substance before using
it, and to put pressure on the Flag State to effect any improvements
that might be necessary. 126 The Roundtable believes that "it is essen-
tial that standards of safety, environmental and social performance are
maintained and enforced by flag states, in full compliance with inter-
national maritime regulations."' 127 Ultimately, it seeks to promote high
performing Flag States because they are less likely to tolerate sub-
standard operators. 128
The Guidelines list the responsibilities that a shipping company
should reasonably expect of a Flag State, and contain a Flag State per-
formance table, which summarizes factual information on the per-
formance of Flag States per the criteria of the Round Table. The
Guidelines are also intended to be used by policy makers who are in-
volved in maritime safety and flag administrations. 29 Although the
Guidelines are thorough, they are only recommendatory and are there-
fore not binding. 30
The Guidelines provide, inter alia, that a Flag State should have
sufficient infrastructure, "should endeavor to ratify principal interna-
tional maritime treaties"'' and implement and enforce the detailed re-
quirements of the treaties; should establish appropriate controls over
organizations who will conduct statutory surveys of ships on their be-
half; should approve safe manning levels for ships on their flag and
issue safe manning documents in accordance with the provisions of
the IMO; should carry out investigations of any serious casualty oc-
curring to its ships as soon as practicable after the casualty; only ac-
cept ships transferring their flag when it is satisfied that it is in com-
pliance with international requirements; should conduct self
assessment of functions related to safety of life at sea; and should at-
tend IMO meetings.'32
126. See GUIDELINES, supra note 50, at 3.
127. Id. at 1.
128. Id. at 5.
129. Id. at 1.
130. See id.
131. GUIDELINES, supra note 50, at 6.
132. Id. at 6-8.
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Another effort aimed at improving Flag State performance is the
Model Audit Scheme approved by the IMO in 2003. It is designed to
promote maritime safety and environmental protection by determining
the extent to which its Flag State Parties are implementing and enforc-
ing IMO instruments.133 Under the Model Audit Scheme, vessels will
be subject to external audit as of 2005.1" The IMO will provide
Member States with assistance through its Integrated Technical Co-
operation Programme, and will provide feedback and advice concern-
ing the Member Flag States' performance and shortcomings.135 The
scheme is to be on a voluntary basis136 and is fully supported by the
shipping industry. 137
While the international community is reacting to the need for a
more comprehensive legal framework in order to protect our oceans,
the recent developments mentioned above are not entirely global in
nature and do not hold the Flag States accountable for the actions of
vessels flying their flags. For these reasons the implementation of a
Model Flag State Compliance Agreement would be a sensible step in
the creation of a truly global legal framework that would ensure com-
pliance by vessel owners, operators, and Flag States.
C. FAO Flag State Compliance Agreement
The FAO Flag State Compliance Agreement was approved by the
Food and Agriculture Organization Conference at its Twenty-Seventh
Session on November 24, 1993.138 The purpose of the Agreement is to
develop management measures for the conservation of living re-
sources on the high seas.139 It is "designed to strengthen enforcement
133. See Voluntary IMO Member State Audit Scheme, IMO Assembly Res. A.946(23)(June 16-20, 2003) [hereinafter IMO Assembly Res.].
134. IMO Model Audit Scheme Gains Momentum, IMO Council, 89th Sess., Nov. 25-29,
2002, available at http://www.imo.org/InfoResource/mainframe.asp?topicid=114&doc
_id=2429.
135. See IMO Member State Audit Scheme is Tool to Eliminate Sub-Standard Shipping,
Says IMO Secretary-General, IMO, Mar. 3, 2004, http://www.imo.org/newsroomimain-
frame.asp?topicjid=848&docid=3534.
136. See IMO Assembly Res., supra note 133.
137. Press Release, Maritime International Secretariat Services, Shipping Industry
Launches Guidelines on Flag State Performance, Nov. 24, 2003, available at http://www.
marisec.org/news/pressrel.htm#24%2ONovember%2004.
138. Agreement, supra note 5. The Agreement applies to all fishing vessels that are used
or intended for fishing on the high seas. Id. art. 2(1). For the purpose of this paper, and to
show how the Agreement can serve as a model, not just for the governance of Fishing vessels
but also for all commercial vessels on the high seas that register with Flag States, I will omit
the term "fishing" from the text of the Agreement.
139. Id. at pmbl. The FAO compliance Agreement is intended to be an integral part of the
20
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of high seas conservation obligations arising under [UNC]LOS [] by
elaborating on flag state duties. . . "' It entered into force on April
23, 2003 when the Republic of Korea, the 25 th country to accept the
Agreement, deposited its acceptance instrument as required by provi-
sion XI. I of the Agreement. 141
The FAO Compliance Agreement is comprehensive and wide
reaching in nature because it addresses a variety of critical areas with
respect to the governance of vessels by Flag States. Amongst the
more important areas the Agreement touches on are the following: the
responsibility of Flag States to consider the past history of vessels and
the vessels' past relationships with other Flag States; national en-
forcement mechanisms against non-compliant vessels including possi-
ble sanctions; the marking of vessels for identification purposes; in-
ternational cooperation among Flag States; the duty of parties to the
Agreement to persuade non-Members to accept the Agreement; assis-
tance to developing countries provided by developed member states
and the FAO; the oversight of the system by the FAO who plays a
critical administrative role; and the establishment of a much needed
information bank, or global registry. These highlighted themes are
discussed below in greater detail.
1. Flag State Responsibilities
The FAO Agreement primarily addresses a Flag State's responsi-
bilities in governing vessels that fly its flag. For example, it provides
generally "that "[e]ach Party shall take measures as may be necessary
to ensure that . . . vessels entitled to fly its flag do not engage in any
activity that undermines the effectiveness of international conserva-
tion and management measures."' 42 The Flag State must ensure it is
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, which is a voluntary Code adopted by the 170
members of the FAO and is being disseminated throughout the world. For more information
on the Code, see FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE U.N., WHAT IS THE CODE OF
CONDUCT FOR RESPONSIBLE FISHERIES? (2001), available at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/
003/X9066E/X9066E00.HTM (last visited Mar. 11, 2005).
140. Bernard H. Oxman, Complementary Agreements and Compulsory Jurisdiction, 95
AM. J. INT'L L. 277, 307 n.135 (2001).
141. See Legal Office Treaties, Agreement to Promote Compliance with International
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, tbl. 1, at
http://www.fao.org/Legal/treaties/012s-e.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Legal
Office Treaties]. The other countries that have accepted the Agreement are: Argentina, Bar-
bados, Benin, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Egypt, The European Community, Georgia, Ghana, Ja-
pan, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Norway, Peru, St. Kitts
& Nevis, St. Lucia, Seychelles, Sweden, Tanzania, The United States of America, and Uru-
guay. See id
142. Agreement, supra note 5, art. III(l)(a).
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capable of effectively exercising its responsibilities under the Agree-
ment in light of the "links"'' 3 that exist between it and the vessel. In
the event a Flag State grants exemptions to vessels pursuant to the
Agreement, the Flag State must ensure the spirit of the Convention is
still carried out with respect to the vessels.'"
More specifically, the Agreement governs Flag State responsibili-
ties on the registration and authorization of vessels.145 It puts the Flag
State in charge of authorizing every vessel that seeks to fish on the
high seas using its flag." All vessels must fulfill specified conditions,
both under the Agreement and those specified by the Flag State, in or-
der to receive the authorization.'47 For instance, the Agreement pre-
cludes a Flag State from authorizing a vessel that had previously
flown the flag of another Party and who acted contrary to the Agree-
ment's objectives.148 Also, the Parties must ensure that all vessels that
fly its flag are marked in such as way that they can be "readily identi-
fied in accordance with generally accepted standards."' 49  Vessels
must further provide their Flag State with information on their opera-
tions so the Party can fulfill its obligations under the Agreement."' 5 °
The Agreement also calls for international cooperation among
Member Flag States that allows them to control vessels on the high
seas. According to the Agreement, Parties should work together to ex-
change information relating to the activities of vessels of Member and
non-Member States in order to help them identify vessels that might
be engaging in operations that threaten to undermine the goals of the
Agreement.15' Furthermore, if a vessel is voluntarily in the port of a
Party, and the Party has "reasonable grounds for believing [] the fish-
ing vessel has been used for an activity that undermines the effective-
ness of international conservation and management measures, [it]
143. Id. art. 111(3). The links referred to in this article most likely concern the relation-
ship of the vessels to the Flag State. If the vessels are owned and operated by non-nationals
there is a greater responsibility on the Flag State to ensure they can oversee the vessels activi-
ties.
144. Id. art. II(1)(b).
145. The Agreement refers to "authorization" as authorization to fish on the high seas.
Id. art. 111(2). However, I will refer to authorization generally which, for purposes of this arti-
cle, can imply authorization to use the high seas for commerce purposes.
146. Id.
147. Id. art. m(6).
148. Id. art. Ill(5)(a). This provision also applies to Flag States that are not Parties to the
Agreement, if there is sufficient information available to the Party concerning the circum-
stances of suspended or withdrawn authorization. Id. art. m(5)(b).
149. Id. art. 11I(6).
150. Id. arts. m(6), (7).
151. Id. art. V(1).
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shall promptly notify the [vessel's] flag state ... 152 The Parties can
then take measures to establish an investigatory strategy to confirm or
dispel the suspicion."' The Parties should also exchange information
amongst themselves that relate to the activities of vessels flying the
flags of non-Parties, and that might undermine the effectiveness of the
international conservation and management measures. 154 These provi-
sions ensure all vessels on the high seas are monitored by the network
of Member Flag States.
The Agreement allocates the task of developing compliance-
inducing mechanisms for non-compliant vessels to the Flag States in
an effort to make lax Flag States become more responsible for vessels
flying their flags. It asks its Parties to implement appropriate national
enforcement measures for vessels that do not comply with the objec-
tives set forth in the Agreement. These measures can include making
such violations an offense under the Flag State's national laws, the
application of sanctions to the vessel owner or operator, and with-
drawal or suspension of authorization to sail under the flag. 155
The Agreement considers that some States will not wish to adopt
the Agreement, while some States who adopt it will be unable to carry
out the provisions for lack of technology or resources. It therefore
places additional duties on Flag States to persuade non-Parties to join
the Agreement and to adopt national laws that are consistent with it,
and to ensure non-Parties do not engage in activities that could un-
dermine the effectiveness of the Agreement. 156 And, interestingly, this
Agreement encourages its Parties to provide assistance (which specifi-
cally includes technical assistance) to developing countries that are
also Parties to the Agreement, to help them to fulfill their obligations
under it. The FAO and other international or regional organizations
should also support this endeavor. 157
2. Food and Agriculture Organization
Under the Compliance Agreement the Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization plays a critical role as administrator and overseer. In this
capacity, the FAO is in charge of collecting and organizing informa-
tion relevant to the Agreement provided by the Member Flag States.
152. Id. art. V(2).
153. Id.
154. Id. art. VIII(3).
155. Id. art. 11(8).
156. Id. arts. VIII(I), (2).
157. Id. art. VII.
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For example, the Agreement has extensive requirements governing the
exchange of information between the Parties and the FAO. The Par-
ties to the Agreement are required to make readily available to the
FAO the following information regarding each vessel flying its flag:
the name of the vessel, its registration number, its port of registry, any
previously known names of the vessels, if it had a previous flag, the
International Radio Call Sign, if applicable, the name and addresses of
owners, and the length and type of the vessel.'58
The Parties are also required to provide the vessel operators'
names and addresses and the vessel's molded depth, beam, gross reg-
ister tonnage, main engine power, as possible. 5 9 In addition, the Par-
ties to the Agreement are required to promptly inform the FAO if
there are changes to the record, for any reason, including vessels no
longer permitted to fly the flag, fishing authorizations relinquished or
not renewed by owners, authorizations withdrawn for legal violations,
and vessels lost, decommissioned, or scrapped. 16°
Each Party is further required to notify the FAO of" activities of
fishing vessels flying its flag that undermine the effectiveness of in-
ternational conservation and management measures .... 1 61 And if a
Party has a suspicion that a vessel flying the flag of a different Flag
State is engaging in these types of activities, it must advise the Flag
State of the vessel and can also advise the FAO. 162
The FAO, in turn, periodically distributes selected information
provided by the Flag States regarding vessels flying under their flag to
all of the Parties and, upon request, to any individual Party or fisheries
organization. 63 In a Circular State Letter sent in October 1995, the
FAO asked Flag States that had accepted the Agreement to submit in-
formation concerning vessel authorizations to the FAO information
bank. 164 This database, called the High Seas Vessel Authorization Re-
cord (HSVAR), is currently available online to those Member Parties
who have contributed information.1 65 "It allows [the Member Flag
158. Id. arts. VI(1)(a)-(g).
159. Id. arts. VI(2)(a), (c)-(f).
160. Id. arts. VI(5)(a), (b) & VI(6).
161. Id. art. VI(8)(a).
162. Id. art. VI(8)(b).
163. Id. art. VI(4).
164. FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries: Introduction to the Code, at
http://www.fao.org/fi/agreem/codecond/codecon.asp#AGREEM (last visited Mar. 11, 2005)
[hereinafter FAO Code of Conduct].
165. See id. The Parties that can access the database are: "Canada, the United States, Ja-
pan, Norway and 13 European Union countries ...." FAO, HSVAR: High Seas Vessels Au-
thorization Record, at http://www.fao.org/figis/hsvar/index.jsp (last visited Mar. 11, 2005)
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States] to identify ... vessels with a number of distinctive identifiers,
and consult information on [the vessels'] registration, authorization,
and infringements, etc.' 1 66 To date there are 5,517 records in the da-
tabase. 167
IV. ANALYSIS: A MODEL FAO FLAG STATE COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT
AS APPLIED TO THE PRESTIGE AND OTHER SHIPPING VESSELS
The use of the seas by the international shipping industry cannot
be underestimated in importance to the world economy.'68 The impor-
tance of the shipping industry increases with globalization and rising
demands in international commerce. Therefore it is critical that the
industry itself is well controlled, secure, and therefore effective. This
section explains how a Model FAO Compliance Agreement, as ap-
plied to the shipping industry, would further these goals.
A. Need for Measures: Vessel Structure and the Environment
Environmental oil-tanker disasters come from lack of mainte-
nance of vessels, which leads to structural deficiencies such as corro-
sion, deformation, and poor operation. Therefore it is important that
vessels on the high seas, and especially those carrying thousands of
tons of toxic cargo, are in seaworthy condition. Under the current laws
of the seas, if Flag States do not oversee the structure and maintenance
of the tankers and enforce internationally accepted standards, no one
will. It is essential then that Flag States be encouraged to oversee the
structure and condition of all vessels flying their flag and to enforce
necessary measures against non-compliant vessels.
The Prestige had major structural failures leading to her demise
off the Costa del Muerte.'69 So did the Erika, which also resulted in
[hereinafter HSVAR].
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. For example, in 2002 the world merchant fleet was at 844.2 million deadweight
tons, and there were 5.88 billion tons of seaborne goods traded. UNCTAD Report, supra note
2, at x. Of this trade, 36.1% constituted tanker cargoes, 76.8% of which were crude oil. Id. at
6.
169. See El FIDAC Atribuye a un "fallo estructural" de los Tanques de Lastre el Acci-
dente del 'Prestige,' EL MUNDO (Spain), May 8, 2003, available at http://www.elmundo
.es/elmundo/2003/05/08/ciencia/1052406288.html. According to a report by the International
Fund for Indemnification for harm due to Hidrocaruros Pollution, the structural failures of the
tanks came from a loss of localized resistance due to a deformation, loosening or fracture of
the longitudinal side supports. Id
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its cracking in half and sinking. 7 ° There are other defective vessels
that freely roam the oceans, many of which carry toxic cargo, and can
potentially cause massive environmental disasters like the Prestige oil
spill.
The older the ship, the more likely it is to have a structural defi-
ciency, and therefore, an accident. 17 1 In 2003, 28.1 percent of the
world's fleet was 20 years old and older.'72 For the life of a ship, this
is considered very old. 173 Therefore there should be incentives on Flag
States to ensure that vessels flying their flags are in good condition,
and they should further be encouraged to scrap older vessels to lower
the average age of the fleet.
The problem of aging fleets roaming the ocean is aggravated by
the fact that the oil transport market has become highly competitive. 174
Oil companies have disposed of most of their older tanker fleets,
where many small independent tanker owners have come forward to
fill this gap in the market. 75 Additionally tanker owners are becoming
autonomized, whereby they split their fleet into a few single-ship
companies that are registered in offshore locations, helping them to
reduce financial risks.'76 This process makes it difficult to determine
the true financial owners and those who are responsible for the safe
operations of the vessel. ' As a result "low-cost operators gain market
shares at the expense of traditional companies with a decent safety re-
cord.' 1 78 Measures to improve and effectively control maintenance
and operational safety on-board ships are urgently needed.
A model FAO-type agreement applicable to vessels other than
fishing vessels, would help to monitor the structure and condition of
vessels. The FAO Agreement, like the existing legal framework, re-
lies on the responsibility of the Flag States as the main mechanism for
compliance and enforcement of the Agreement. Flag States are in a
better position to know the conditions of the vessels flying their flag,
than any international organization, for which the responsibility and
amount of information is too vast. It provides the Flag States with the
170. After Erika: European OPA? 105 MARINE LoG, 2,39, Feb. 1, 2000.
171. See Kdnig, supra note 102, at 46.
172. UNCTAD Report, supra note 2, at 2.
173. For example, "60 out of 77 tanker casualties between 1992 and 1999 were over 20
years of age." K6nig, supra note 102, at 46. See also EC Regulation, supra note 101, para. 6
(discussing the phasing out of tankers over 15 years old).
174. See Kcnig, supra note 102, at 46.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 47.
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guidelines and information that they will need to be able to oversee
the vessels' physical condition.
Under the Agreement Flag States must provide the FAO with de-
tailed information on each vessel that flies its flag. They are obligated
to provide the name and address of the operators of the vessels, the
molded depth, beam gross register tonnage and power of main engines
of the vessel. 179 The Flag States have to keep the FAO informed of
any changes in this information.
The Agreement precludes a Flag State from authorizing a vessel
that was once previously registered with another Party to the Agree-
ment, but that had undermined the effectiveness of international con-
servation and management measures. 180 Therefore, if a vessel is disal-
lowed to fly the flag of one Flag State due to its structure or age, all
other Flag States must be made aware and deny registry to the vessel.
The Agreement also asks the Parties to ensure all vessels that fly its
flag are marked in such a way that they can be readily identified.
181
This helps the Flag State and FAO keep track of vessels. Furthermore,
the vessels must provide the Flag States with information on their op-
erations, which in the case of a structural deficiency problem, like the
crack in the starboard of the Prestige, the Flag State becomes immedi-
ately aware and can take action.
82
The Agreement also contains a much needed compliance-
inducement mechanism. It provides that Parties must implement na-
tional enforcement measures for vessels not complying with the rules
set forth in the Agreement. 183 In accordance with this provision, Flag
States could apply monetary sanctions to the vessel operator or sus-
pend or withdraw the authorization to fly its flag if the problem is not
fixed."8 This provision would further encourage ship owners and op-
erators registering their vessels with Flag States to ensure their vessels
are seaworthy.
The key purpose of the Agreement is that all Flag States ensure all
vessels flying their flags are in safe condition to go to sea. If some
Flag States do not enforce these norms, there will continue to be acci-
dents on the high seas that impact concerned States who are compli-
ant. Therefore, it is in the interest of the Parties to the Agreement that
all Flag States join the Agreement and adopt laws and provisions con-
179. Agreement, supra note 5, arts. VI(2)(a), (c), (e), (f).
180. Id. art. lI(5)(a).
181. Id. art. HI(6).
182. Id. art. 111(7).
183. Id. art. 11(8).
184. Id.
229
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sistent with it. According to the Agreement, Parties should attempt to
persuade non-Parties to "accept [the] Agreement and [] to adopt laws
and regulations consistent with [it]". 85
Furthermore, they should act in such a manner, consistent with the
Agreement and international law, to ensure that non-Parties do not en-
gage in activities that could undermine the effectiveness of the
Agreement. 186 The need to have participation and compliance by all
Flag States and vessels is addressed by the provision of the Agree-
ment, which encourages its Parties, the IMO, and other international
and regional organizations to provide assistance (including technical
assistance) to developing countries that are Parties to the Agreement,
in order to help them to fulfill their obligations under the Agree-
ment. 87 This not only encourages developing countries to accede to
the Agreement, but it makes sure these countries have the necessary
infrastructure to monitor their vessels and exchange information.
In order to create a system that ensures all vessels on our seas are
seaworthy, the exchange of information among countries and organi-
zations is vital, as the seas are vast and vessels are numerous. The
proposed Model Agreement calls for much needed international coop-
eration among Flag States.'88 According to the Agreement, Parties
should work together to exchange information relating to the activities
of vessels that help Flag States to identify those vessels which might
be engaging in operations that threaten to undermine international
conservation and management. 89 Clearly, structurally deficient ves-
sels would be covered by this provision.
Furthermore, if a vessel is voluntarily at the port of a Party, the
Party should promptly notify the Flag State if it has reasonable
grounds for believing the vessel poses a threat to international conser-
vation. 190 The Parties can then take measures to investigate the vessel
185. Id. art. VIII(l).
186. Id. art. VIII(2).
187. Id. art. VII.
188. The Prestige accident might have been avoided had there been a better system in
place to facilitate the collection and dissemination of information of vessels on the high seas.
The Prestige had major structural deficiencies, and had been registered as unacceptable for
navigation in the ship registry of the Norwegian Oil Company Statoil due to its age and com-
pany policy. See Criticas, Responsiblidades y Culpas en el Desastre del 'Prestige,' supra no-
te 37. Had there been a system in place, which encourages the reporting and sharing of in-
formation regarding sea bound vessels, the accident could have been prevented. See Annual
Report 2002-Theme: Demanding Trade-Strict Controls, STATOIL, at http://www. sta-
toil.tom (last visited Mar. 11, 2005).
189. Id. art. V(1).
190. Id. art. V(2).
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in order to confirm or dispel the suspicion. 9' The Parties should also
exchange information amongst themselves that relate to the activities
of vessels flying the flags of non-Parties, which might be of a similar
threat.192
Also, under the FAO Compliance Agreement, Flag States must
implement a licensing program or require some form of authorization
for vessels to fish on the high seas.'93 They can only grant this au-
thorization if they can truly and effectively exercise their responsibili-
ties under the Agreement with respect to each vessel. These require-
ments could be extended to the shipping industry and require that Flag
States, aside from the registration requirement, issue a license for
commerce on the high seas. The granting of the license could be con-
ditioned on the vessels' sound structure and seaworthy condition. The
Flag State would then be limited to issuing these licenses only if it is
able to effectively oversee and exercise their responsibilities over the
vessels.
By encouraging Flag States to keep track of the structure and con-
dition of vessels flying their flag, to implement national enforcement
measures, to cause other Flag States to join the Agreement, to assist
developing Flag States to do the same, to share in the dissemination of
information, and to work jointly with other Flag States and the FAO,
the FAO Compliance Agreement serves as a exemplary model
Agreement for the shipping industry and would effectively control the
conditions of vessels on the high seas.194
B. Implementing a Model FAO Agreement: Problems and
Considerations
1. Using the FAO for Non-Fishing Vessels
Once the FAO Compliance Agreement has proven effective in
preventing over-fishing of the seas, it should be extended to, or used
as a model for, shipping vessels as well. The merchant fleet domi-
nates the seas carrying thousands of tons of cargo, and therefore mer-
chant vessels are most likely to cause pollution accidents. If a Model
Agreement was instituted to apply to the shipping industry most of the
191. Id.
192. Id. art. VIII(3).
193. Id. art. 1I(2).
194. The implementation of a model Compliance Agreement would also help to facilitate
the efforts to combat marine terrorism. The collection and dissemination of information per-
taining to vessels as provided for in the Agreement would enable States and the governing
body to monitor the activities of all vessels on the high seas.
231
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FAO provisions addressed in this article could remain the same, but
become applicable instead to commercial shipping vessels.
Further, the scope and purpose of Agreement could be expanded
under a Model Agreement to not only include conservation of living
resources on the high seas but the conservation of coastal environ-
ments as well as safety and security. The system of vessel authoriza-
tion by the Flag State required for fishing could also be applied to
merchant ships, whereby the vessels would need to obtain some type
of license or authorization to carry out shipping activities on the high
seas.
The biggest consideration for establishing a model Compliance
Agreement to govern the shipping industry is discerning which inter-
national body is most appropriate to oversee the Agreement. Al-
though this issue is beyond the scope of this article, it should be men-
tioned that an undertaking of this magnitude would best be governed
by a significant organization such as the International Maritime Or-
ganization, or another United Nations body, where the FAO is more
limited in scope.
2. Encouraging Flag States to Join the Agreement
When the FAO Compliance Agreement was initially drafted and
presented to Flag States, there was a very pessimistic reaction by the
international community. 95 In fact it took ten years for the Agreement
to enter into force.96 Nonetheless the Agreement is currently in force,
with 27 members, 97 and because of it a global database has been de-
veloped containing information on thousands of vessels, which is
available on line for participating countries to access. 98 This is an en-
couraging development and demonstrates the ability of Flag States to
address international concerns regarding the regulation of the envi-
ronment and the management of the seas.
The Agreement contains provisions, discussed above, that encour-
age Members to persuade non-Members to join the Agreement. It is
very important that all Flag States offering registry services are parties
to the Agreement. This should therefore be one of the main focuses of
the Agreement, the Flag States and relevant governing body. If all
195. See, e.g., Bruce Odessey, Hard Fought Fishing Agreements Languish Years without
Force, USIS WASH. FiLE, Feb. 3, 1999, http://canberra.usembassy.gov/hyper/WF990203/
epf3O6.htm.
196. See Legal Office Treaties, supra note 141 and accompanying text.
197. See id.
198. See FAO Code of Conduct, supra note 164; HSVAR supra note 165.
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Flag States would become members to the Agreement there would be
universal standards, eliminating flags of convenience whereby ships
with bad compliance records could no longer shop around.
But because of industry interests and short-term profits many
Agreements like the Compliance Agreement have been blocked by a
number of countries.'99 Therefore international community pressure is
the best means of enforcing the Agreement. 200 Again, as provided for
in the Agreement, Member States along with the international com-
munity will have to take measures to cause non-Member Flag States
to accede to the Agreement.20'
Furthermore, it is in the Flag State and shipping companies' inter-
ests to have a good compliance record. For example vessels who fly
the flags of Flag States with a higher than average record of "non-
compliance during port state control inspections are generally subject
to special port state control targeting" and more inspections. 2° This is
inefficient for ship operators. Also companies who are registered with
unscrupulous Flag States will develop a bad reputation. 203 Further-
more, where there is trend toward corporate social responsibility,
many companies are shying away from practices that could give way
to public scrutiny.'
Under a Model FAO type Agreement, Flag States themselves will
have more pressure to comply with, and cause their vessels to comply
with international law. The "reputation model of compliance" of in-
ternational law is based on the theory that international law affects
state behavior and causes states to comply with laws out of concern of
developing an adverse reputation which results from violations of in-
ternational laws and norms.205 A state's reputation has value and pro-
vides a country with benefits by promoting "long-term relationships
with other cooperative states, provid[ing] a greater ability to make
binding promises, and reduc[ing] the perceived need for monitoring
and verification. ' ' 2° Therefore, Flags States that seek to have a posi-
tive reputation in the global community for purposes of politics and
199. See Odessey, supra note 195.
200. See Richard J. Silk, Jr., Note: Nonbinding Dispute Resolution Processes in Fisheries
Conflicts: Fish Out of Water?, 16 OHO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 791, 794 (2001).
201. See Odessey, supra note 195.
202. GUIDELINES, supra note 50, at 5.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A SOCIAL
CONTRACTS APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS (1999).
205. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL.
L. REv. 1823 (2002).
206. Id. at 1849.
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business and will therefore honor their international commitments be-
cause it is in their own future interests.
The Model Agreement could establish additional incentives for
poor-performing Flag States. A global database, much like the High
Seas Vessel Authorization Record that already exists, 07 could be cre-
ated but accessible to the entire international community much like the
black lists currently compiled by the EU and Port State Authorities.
The governing body could issue ratings and give points to Flag States
for measures taken toward implementing the Agreement and carrying
out the Agreement's goals. These points, aside from giving the Flag
State approval of its practices, could also add up to give the Flag State
perks like freedom from port inspections, or publicity in a well circu-
lated periodical.
3. Into the Future: A Global Registry?
Given that all of the land on earth is inhabited or claimed by
Mankind, and the oceans continue to belong to everyone in a state of
anarchy, the demand for its use and the resulting problems will persist
into the future.08 It is clear drastic measures must be taken to address
these issues. While a model Compliance Agreement would be a sig-
nificant advancement in controlling vessels on the shadowy oceans,
the possibility of establishing a Global Registry with a supranational
body to oversee it might ultimately be the answer to the lawless seas.
A model Compliance Agreement could therefore be used as an interim
step in the creation of a Global Registry for vessels.
If a Model Agreement were adopted it is possible it could evolve
into a Global Registry for shipping vessels. Such a Global Registry
would require all commercial vessels seeking to traverse the high seas
register with it and/or obtain an authorization or license to conduct
commerce by way of the high seas. And, like the current law of the
sea framework, if a vessel were not authorized by the Global Registry,
it could not sail with impunity and could be boarded by any State at
any time while on the high seas. It would also be necessary to estab-
lish a Global Registry Agreement that would contain minimum stan-
dards for vessels, like the Compliance Agreement. These provisions
could be even further refined, to target specific problem areas such as
vessel age and structure.
207. See HSVAR, supra note 165.
208. For more information on the growing levels of demand for the use of our oceans, see
MTS Report, Ch. 3, Trends and Competitive Pressures.
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Furthermore, a Global Registry would require an information
bank like the High Seas Vessels Authorization Record, developed un-
der the FAO Agreement. Such a database would enable all States
(and especially Coastal States) to access data pertaining to all vessels
using the seas, allowing them to keep watch of the oceans in their best
interest. Like the HSVAR, it could contain information such as the
distinctive characteristics that identify vessels, and provide informa-
tion on the registration, authorization, history, condition and infringe-
ments of each vessel registered.
A model Compliance Agreement could therefore serve as an in-
terim step in the development of a Global Registry because it already
has thorough provisions that establish uniform standards, cooperation
among States, incentives for non-Party States to become members,
and most importantly, the creation of a global information database on
vessels.
V. CONCLUSION
The evolution of international laws of the seas has created a legal
system of mare liberum. This system is increasingly less compatible
with globalization, which is demanding domination of the seas for
commerce, causing serious global problems such as marine pollution.
Despite numerous international efforts to address these emerging
problems, including the implementation of many international and re-
gional agreements, and the creation of international organizations
dedicated to addressing the issues, we continue to experience large-
scale problems like the sinking of the Prestige oil tanker.
It is crucial that our competing interests on the high seas-the im-
portance of the shipping industry to the world economy, the protection
of the marine environment, and state autonomy-be reconciled with
one another. The sinking of the Prestige is just one more reminder
that the need for effective oversight, accountability and regulation of
the shipping industry has never been greater.
A model FAO Compliance Agreement that applies to the shipping
industry in its entirety would be a significant step towards controlling
Flag States and vessels, making our oceans more secure. The Agree-
ment builds on the current legal framework, governs both vessels and
Flag States, establishes a much-needed global information bank and
system for information exchange, and contains compliance-inducing
mechanisms. It is global in scope and has provisions that encourage
States to be bound by the Agreement and to cause other States to ac-
cede to and be bound by it as well. As such, its provisions adequately
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address the problem of marine pollution. A Model Agreement might
also serve as an appropriate interim step in the creation of a Global
Registry, which would ultimately be a significant contribution to con-
trolling the seas.
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